Questioning the assumptions we make

As a professional it is very easy to become so immersed in your own world that you develop a form of tunnel vision. And this can undermine your ability to fully appreciate other perspectives. The practical consequence of which is that it can then impair the relevance or effectiveness of your products, services or relationships.

One example of this is in the way that organisations (often unconsciously) form assumptions about how people should behave. And when they (customers, employees, partners etc.) deviate from that anticipated behaviour, it is frequently attributed to some form of ‘irrationality’ on their behalf.

The solution is then quickly and almost imperceptibly framed as one in which the other parties behaviour needs correcting. Options may include education, some form or coercion, or even control based interventions. But it is understood that the wise and rational organisation needs to provide a remedy to the irrational external party.

Whilst common, this approach creates a costly organisational blind spot. Because it bypasses any, or meaningful, consideration of what assumptions the organisation has (explicit or implicit) that underpin their expectation of what are appropriate behaviours.

And whether in fact the ‘irrational behaviours’ may be perfectly sensible but just reflect a different reality (people have many and often co-existing influences on their behaviour) that the organisation was previously unaware of. If so, then it is clear that any attempt to try and change these behaviours is likely to fail or at best have limited effect.

I first noticed this tendency during my previous career in the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) when I was leading a study of how people respond to discovering a fire in the home. People were not acting in accordance with our advice, so we wanted to learn why and ‘educate’ them to be more compliant. As wise professionals we needed to correct the irrational behaviour of the public.

However, as we undertook our research and spoke to people who had experienced a fire, it quickly became clear that the issue was with our advice and not their response. The reverse of our original proposition.

A good example was in relation to the FRS advice regarding pets which can be summarised as: “In the event of a fire, do not delay your exit by trying to locate a pet”.

If you own a pet or know someone who does, you will perhaps instantly notice the obvious flaw – very few people are prepared to just leave their pets. In fact, most pet owners we interviewed stated that concern for a pet was the primary influence on their actions. And you will not change that behaviour with any form of advice.

Assuming people would leave their pets was the first flawed assumption we identified. But even in such a succinct piece of advice there were others which had the effect of corrupting the accuracy of our expectation in terms of how people ‘should’ respond.

A second assumption (or perhaps more correctly generalisation) is the reference to ‘a fire’ as if there is a singular or standard version. In fact, there are multiple factors which create a wide range of potential scenarios people will encounter. Fortunately, the vast majority of these are small and pose little risk. As such our guidance which was based on the worst case (an immediate and high risk) was just not relevant for the vast majority of people.

Another implicit assumption is the expectation that professional advice has sufficient authority to override any other considerations that people may have. One consequence is that the advice fails to recognise that in fact people will make multiple decisions when discovering a fire. But the false assumption means they have to do so without any help from the professionals.

In fact, there were a number of other assumptions we found in our advice regarding pets during our research. But hopefully the above examples sufficiently illustrate how individually and cumulatively the false assumptions had a corrupting effect on our expectations of people’s behaviour. And in turn the relevance and effectiveness of our advice. Clearly, to spend more time and resource trying to educate the public would have been the wrong, and an ineffective solution.

So what was the solution? In fairness it is not easy to provide advice that is generic and brief to an event that is inherently variable and dynamic. And many FRS are still struggling with this. But what is clear is that the key to doing so is to start with a shared understanding rather than a polarised and inside out view of how others should behave. And this then creates a shared aim of how to help people stay safe when discovering a fire. Accepting that this includes the public undertaking a range of actions commensurate with the risk, their ability and priorities.

But crucially that shift in perspective identifies that advice alone is always going to be insufficient. The real task is to take a wider view and consider how other solutions such as design approaches and operational interventions could help to better align expected and actual behaviours. And these solutions would be far more within the control of the FRS than trying to use advice to change the actions of others.

This is not just something that applies to the FRS but is present in one form or another in most organisations. When there is a gap between the expected behaviours and actual ones, start by looking at the root cause of the expectation (i.e. organisational assumptions), rather than treating the symptoms of external behaviours. Doing so will reveal new solutions that are likely to be more effective.